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 1. Introduction 
In this paper we try to add to the understanding of households’ investment choices and the 
role that financial advice plays on investment choice. Using a proprietary dataset containing 
information of 405,107 individual investors in a nationwide retirement investment savings scheme 
called KiwiSaver, we investigate the role that financial advice plays on asset allocation. We address 
four key questions in this paper. Who receives financial advice? Do people who get financial advice 
have a different asset allocation than people who do not?  What roles can investor gender, wealth 
and age have on portfolio composition in relation to financial advice? And finally, what differences in 
portfolio returns exist under financial advice? 
First, we find that female, wealthier, and older investors are more likely to receive 
investment advice.  Second, investors who receive advice tend to hold a higher portion of equity in 
their investment accounts compared to those who do not receive financial advice.  Third, investors 
who receive advice hold more equities, with this effect being strongest in male, younger and 
wealthier investors. Significant differences in portfolio asset allocations also exist between male and 
female investors. Women tend to hold more cash and bond assets in their portfolios, while men 
tend to hold more Equity and Property assets.  However, when comparing women who receive 
advice to men who have not we find that women have more aggressive portfolios with higher 
proportions of equity assets.  Fourth, we find that advisers provide recommendations in line with 
well-known life-cycle based theories introduced by Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992). The life-
cycle theory explains the effect of the labour-leisure choice on portfolio and consumption decisions 
over an individual’s life cycle, highlighting that the young (with greater labour flexibility over their 
working lifetimes) may take significantly greater investment risks than the old. Finally, comparing 
investment fund returns we find that investors who receive advice tend to earn higher returns in 
years where equity markets perform well. 
A handful of empirical studies have analysed the relationship between financial advice and 
asset allocation. However, the findings are mixed. For instance, Mullainathan, Noth and Schoar 
(2010) find that advice is positively related to equity exposure compared to Kramer (2012) who finds 
that advised accounts in the Netherlands contain significantly less equity and more fixed income 
securities. Recent studies have also reported contrasting results of whether advised trading accounts 
outperform non-advised accounts. Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) find a negative 
relationship between adviser involvement and investor performance in US mutual funds. Hackethal 
et al. (2012) identify that risk-adjusted returns are lower for advised portfolios caused by higher 
trading costs using German data.  And Hoechle et al. (2013) document that advisors hurt 
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performance in Swiss trading accounts. In direct contrast however, studies also show that advised 
accounts are better diversified and are in line with predefined model portfolios (Shapira & Venezia, 
2001; Bluegthen et al., 2007; & Bhattacharya et al., 2012).  
This paper makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, we exploit the use of a 
new proprietary dataset, KiwiSaver, to understand the relationship between financial advice and 
individual investor decisions in an auto-enrolment setting1. Previous studies have not investigated 
the relation between financial advice in an auto-enrolment retirement investment setting before. 
Our dataset includes information on a nationwide sample that is representative of the population of 
New Zealand. We have information on wealth, age, gender and the asset allocations of investment 
funds and our proprietary dataset comes directly from the records within the investment firms. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the largest sample size of individual investor accounts that is 
representative of a nationwide population. Campbell (2006) states that there are five key criteria 
that an ideal dataset investigating household finance behaviour would need to have, they are: (1) 
cover a representative sample of the entire population; (2) measure total wealth and a breakdown 
of wealth categories; (3) distinguish between asset classes; (4) data would be reported at a high level 
of accuracy and (5) be panel data. Our dataset meets three out of five of Campbell’s (2006) check-
list, and proportionately more requirements than datasets used in previous studies.2  Second, this is 
the first study to look at financial advisers who provide face-to-face investment advice instead of 
using brokerage firm data. Brokerage firm advisers are typically employees of the banks who are 
                                                          
1
 KiwiSaver is a defined-contribution retirement savings scheme launched in New Zealand in 2007. KiwiSaver is 
the world’s first auto-enrolment scheme on a national scale which provides a unique setting to be exploring 
individual investor behaviour. As discussed thoroughly in O’Connell (2009) KiwiSaver contains several 
innovative features, the most prominent feature is the auto-enrolment of individuals into the investment 
scheme. Sometimes called “soft compulsion”, auto-enrolment is designed to reduce the level of inertia in 
relation to savings behaviour by automatically enrolling people who may not otherwise make the effort to join 
KiwiSaver themselves. See Madrian and Shea (2001) for discussion on inertia in 401(k) retirement accounts. 
Workers enrolled can choose to opt out if they wish, but if they stay in the scheme the employer is compelled 
to contribute. To date, the impact of KiwiSaver on the world stage can be seen in the United Kingdom which 
has made a commitment to develop a similar national auto-enrolment savings scheme. 
 
2
 Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2012) use panel data from a German brokerage firm and compare the 
accounts of 32,751 banking customers. Chalmers and Reuter (2010) study 5,807 Optional Retirement Accounts 
from the Oregon University retirement savings plan. They state that their sample of defined contribution plan 
participants is not representative of the general population as it includes faculty and university staff only. 
Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) do not use individual account data but returns of broker-related 
funds. Bluethgen, Gintschel,  Hacklethal, and Mueller (2007) use panel data from a German brokerage house 
with a sample of 4,363 banking customers. Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos and Meyer (2012) use data 
from a German brokerage containing 8,000 individual accounts.  
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providing the investment product, and therefore not independent.3 Previous studies tend not to 
differentiate where advice has come from or what constitutes ‘advice’, which makes comparisons 
between results less precise.  For instance, advice received from brokers, dealers, bank-employees 
and computer-generated algorithms in reality are not the same thing but have all been categorized 
as receiving advice in studies.4   In our study we use a more direct measure to record financial advice 
which matters because dealers, brokers and advisers face different regulations under the law. The 
main difference lies in the standard of care which financial advisers must provide. Investment 
advisers are fiduciaries to their clients which mean they have a duty to serve in the best interests of 
their clients. The standard of care differs for brokers and dealers, who mainly provide execution 
services and may not provide personalised advice. In New Zealand, only Authorised Financial 
Advisers (AFAs) are able to provide investment planning and discretionary management services to 
clients and give personalised advice on KiwiSaver investment products. We are fortunate to measure 
advice at a more personalised level than studies before us and are void of some of the disadvantages 
that come from using brokerage data. As suggested by Goeztmann and Kumar (2008), brokerage 
portfolios may not represent serious investments but investors ‘play-money’ accounts. Hoechle et al. 
(2013) argue while evidence based on brokerage accounts are insightful, there are limitations on the 
conclusions drawn on financial behaviour. And finally the use of online brokerage data may attract 
only a selected sample of a population that is interested in trading and may not be representative as 
discussed in Hackethal et al. (2012).   
Campbell (2006) points out that households are notorious for having low levels of financial 
literacy and making financial mistakes. A number of papers have tried to explain why such large 
proportions of families do not hold stocks. For instance, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) find 
that culture and trust are related to factors of financial decisions; Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) 
explore the role of neighbours and peers, and van Rooji, Lusardi and Alessie (2011) link financial 
literacy with stock market participation.  Our findings raise several questions. First, we show that 
10% of people involved in retirement investment receive financial advice. While we cannot rule out 
that some people may obtain financial advice from outside of our advisers, it remains an important 
question to consider whether those people receiving financial advice are those in the population 
who are most in need of it? Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2007) link age, wealth and education with 
                                                          
3
 For example, Hackethal et al. (2012) use data from a German brokerage and bank. They refer to financial 
advisers as Independent Financial Advisers (IFA) and state that 90% of IFAs in their sample are bank-employees 
who typically place orders on behalf of the client.  
 
4
 See Bluethgen, Gintschel,  Hacklethal and Mueller (2007), Chalmers and Reuter (2010), Hackethal, Haliassos 
and Jappelli (2012) and Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos and Meyer (2012). 
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financial sophistication and show that households with greater financial sophistication tend to invest 
more efficiently.  We find that young investors and those with low account balances are not 
receiving advice and may be among the population who require advice the most. This result is 
similar to that of Bhattacharya et al. (2012) who find those who need financial advice are the least 
likely to obtain it. They suggest reasons why investors are not seeking advice which include a lack of 
financial sophistication, a desire to not increase tax payments and lack of familiarity and trust. This 
reinforces the question raised of whether advice and education should target specific groups in 
need.5 Second, we find advised accounts tend to invest consistent with Bodie, Merton and 
Samuelson’s (1992) life-cycle theory, which explains the effect of the labour-leisure choice on 
portfolio and consumption decisions over an individual’s life cycle.  In addition, the level of risk taken 
is also related to gender, and account balance. This adds to the on-going debate of whether life-cycle 
based default investment options should replace existing conservative-style funds in New Zealand.6  
 
2. Data 
KiwiSaver Investor Data 
The primary dataset, obtained from four large KiwiSaver investment fund companies, 
consists of individual investors’ retirement savings accounts.  We have a large cross-sectional dataset 
which recorded as at 30 June 2011. The data includes investor accounts of 405,107 individuals 
(which represents approximately 10% of the total New Zealand population of 4.4 million people).7 
Our data also includes information on 40,776 individuals who have obtained financial advice within 
the total sample of 405,107. Each individual in our sample holds at least one investment fund, and 
13 investment funds at most. Of the 13 investment fund options available to choose, six investment 
funds are multi-asset funds (including, cash, bond, property and equity asset allocations) and seven 
single asset-funds (cash, domestic bonds, international bonds, domestic property, international 
                                                          
5
 A key outcome of the 2009 Financial Literacy Summit was a call to action that different groups of people have 
different levels of financial knowledge and require targeted communication (see Retirement Commission, 
2019 http://www.cflri.org.nz/financial-literacy/summits/2009-summit) 
 
6
 A review of KiwiSaver Default Provider Arrangements was conducted in 2012. See New Zealand Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment, 2013) http://www.med.govt.nz/business/business-law/current-
business-law-work/changes-to-kiwisaver/default-provider-arrangements  
 
7
 The population of New Zealand is 4,404,500 as at 30 June 2011 according to Statistics New Zealand (2011). 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/estimates_and_projections/demographic-trends-
2011/subnational%20population%20estimates.aspx  
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property, domestic equities and international equities). Table 1 shows the distribution of 
investments fund choice in the sample. 
[Insert Table 1 here ] 
The information associated with each investor includes investment fund choice and 
demographic characteristic features including age, gender, account balance, and tax code. We also 
have information on the number of investment funds that  investors hold, the time period in which 
they have invested in the KiwiSaver scheme and the method of enrolment into the investment fund. 
As there are a number of ways investors can enrol into KiwiSaver funds such as through active 
choice, financial advice channels, employer-preferred provider or via default (a situation where no 
choice has been made by the individual), we account for differences in enrolment method in our 
analysis.   
A separate data file contains information on financial advice. Financial adviser services 
include the giving of financial advice—which means the making of a recommendation or provision of 
advice in relation to acquiring or disposing of a financial product. In New Zealand only Authorised 
Financial Advisers (AFAs) are allowed to give personalised advice on KiwiSaver, which is a category 
one8 investment product under the Financial Advisers Act 2008. Authorised Financial Advisers are 
individually registered and authorised by the Financial Markets Authority (New Zealand financial 
markets regulators) to provide financial adviser services. They can provide investment planning and 
discretionary management services and will generally provide advice on more complex products.  In 
our data, an individual is flagged as having received financial advice if they received advice from a 
registered Authorised Financial Adviser.  
KiwiSaver provides an opportunistic dataset to investigate investor behaviour in a number of 
ways. As put by Campbell (2006, p.3), the ideal dataset for household finance would have at least 
five characteristics. For instance, the data should cover a representative sample of the entire 
population, contain good coverage of both age and wealth (because many aspects of financial 
behaviour vary with these characteristics), measure of both total wealth and an exhaustive 
breakdown of wealth, disaggregate wealth categories to  distinguish between asset classes, the data 
would be reported with a high level of accuracy and finally, the dataset would follow households 
over time. KiwiSaver meets the majority of these criteria, however, it is not perfect. Our dataset 
includes information on a nationwide sample that is representative of the population of New 
Zealand. We have information on wealth, age, gender and the asset allocations of investment funds 
                                                          
8
 Catergory one products are products with more of an investment focus including shares, managed funds and KiwiSaver. 
http://www.fma.govt.nz/glossary/category-1-products/ (Financial Markets Authority, retrieved March 2013).  
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and our proprietary dataset comes directly from the records within the investment firms. There still 
exist a number of data limitations in our study. For example, we do not have panel data, which 
prohibits us from measuring behaviour over time. In addition, our time series is short as KiwiSaver 
has only been operating since 2007. We do not know the total portfolio that people have, thus, the 
values on investment fund information do not represent the total wealth of each person as other 
accounts elsewhere may exist. Despite these data limitations, KiwiSaver provides a unique setting to 
study individual investor behaviour within the context of retirement savings and financial advice. As 
stated in O’Connell (2009), KiwiSaver is fast becoming the predominant vehicle for retirement 
savings in New Zealand and provides a viable working model for other countries seeking to create a 
simple and unified national lifetime savings scheme. It is important therefore to understand the 
choices and their implications within such a framework, especially if other countries in the future are 
going to invest in similar investment schemes. For example, in the United Kingdom.  
Of the four KiwiSaver Providers in our sample, two companies are large retail banks, one 
company is a mutual fund investment firm and the fourth KiwiSaver company is a government 
default-provider.9 Investors in the default-provider category are those who have not selected a 
provider to join (hence by default) while investors in the other three investment funds have joined 
either via self-appointment, appointment of their employers or through financial advice channels. 
Three of the four providers (default provider and two bank providers) offer six investment fund 
options: Cash, Conservative, Conservative-Balanced, Balanced, Balanced-Growth and Growth.  The 
fourth provider offers 13 funds, six of which are identical to the funds offered in the previous funds 
mentioned, and seven additional single-asset class funds which are: Equity, Property, International 
Equity, International Property, Bonds, International Bonds and Sustainable Funds. The asset 
allocations of all funds included in our sample are provided in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The differentiation of the four KiwiSaver providers in the sample enables cross-sectional 
comparisons to be made based on investor demographics. Our sample is extensive, covering almost 
25% of the KiwiSaver population in New Zealand.  
                                                          
9
 Default providers are an important component of KiwiSaver. Default providers have special contracts with Government 
that requires them to meet additional reporting requirements, and default providers' activities and their default 
investment funds are closely monitored. This is because KiwiSaver members joining default providers have not specified a 
choice of provider (or investment fund for that matter), hence are placed in relatively conservative investments. (New 
Zealand Inland Revenue, 2012) Website http://www.kiwisaver.govt.nz/new/providers/  
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Investment Fund Returns 
We obtain KiwiSaver investment fund returns from the Morningstar Direct database from 
2007-2012. All returns are reported net of fees. We also use Morningstar return indices from 
January 2000 to December 2012 to generate monthly, quarterly and annual returns over a 12-year 
time period in order to extend our returns series to the period before KiwiSaver returns existed. This 
12-year time frame includes the longest return series available to best represent KiwiSaver 
investment fund portfolio returns based on actual KiwiSaver investment fund asset allocations. We 
use the ANZ NZ 90 Day Bank Bill to represent Cash returns, ANZ NZ Government Stock to represent 
domestic Fixed Interest returns, the Barclays Global Aggregate Bond Index to represent International 
Fixed Interest return, the NZX Property Index and S&P/ASX 200 A-REIT indices to represent the 
Australasian property market returns, the UBS Global Investors Ex NZL property index to represent 
the international property market return, the Cat 50% NZX 50 & 50% S&P/ASX 200 index to 
represent the Australasian Equity returns and the MSCI World Ex Australia to represent the 
International Equity market returns. The market benchmarks we use in each asset class are in line 
with the benchmarks used by Morningstar for multi-sector funds and are market indices that are 
frequently referred to within the Australasian finance industry. 
 
3. Methodology 
The following probit regression is used to explore which investors are more likely to receive 
financial advice based on their demographic characteristics.   
Financial Advicei =  + 1Agei + 2Femalei + 3FUMi  + i  (1) 
The left hand side variable Financial Advicei is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if an 
investor received financial advice, and 0 otherwise.  is the constant term, Agei is the age of the 
investor in years, Femalei is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the investor is female and 0 if the 
investor is male; FUMi is the value of funds under management in an investor’s KiwiSaver account, 
and i is the error term.  
We run t-tests to examine the differences in portfolio asset holdings and their level of 
significance. We divide the data into subgroups to compare the differences in asset allocation 
between genders, advised and non-advised investors, and fund enrolment through default and 
active enrolment methods. We then run univariate and multivariate regressions to identify the 
relationship between financial advice and holdings within each asset category held within an 
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investor’s portfolio. As noted in Jansen, Fischer and Hackethal (2008) and Bluethgen et al. (2007), 
regressing on the equity asset proportion of an investor’s portfolio captures overall portfolio risk. In 
our model we regress the holdings of each asset class (cash, bonds, property and equity) as the 
percentage share held in investment fund on financial advice to see whether the relationship differs 
across asset classes.   Our  univariate model is: 
% Asset Allocationi =  + 1FinancialAdvicei + i (2)  
The left hand side variable Asset Allocationi is the percentage of asset allocation for j asset 
class categories available in the KiwiSaver fund portfolio for investor i (where j = 4 and asset classes 
are Cash, Bonds, Property and Equity.)   is the constant term, FinancialAdvicei is a dummy variable 
that equals to 1 if the KiwiSaver member has received financial advice and I is the error term.  
In order to control the effect of investor demographic characteristics on portfolio asset 
allocation separately from the effect of financial advice, we use a multivariate framework shown in 
the equation below: 
% Asset Allocationi =  + 1FinancialAdvicei + 2Agei + 3Femalei + 4FUMi + I   (3) 
The left hand side variable Asset Allocationi is the percentage of asset allocation for j asset 
class categories available in the KiwiSaver fund portfolio for investor i (where j = 4 and asset classes 
are Cash, Bonds, Property and Equity).   is the constant term, FinancialAdvicei is a dummy variable, 
which equals to 1 if the KiwiSaver member has received financial advice, Agei is the age of the 
investor in years, Femalei is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the investor is female and 0 if the 
investor is male; FUMi is the value of funds under management in an investor’s KiwiSaver account, 
and I is the error term.  
Interaction terms are added for age, gender and funds under management with financial 
advice in order to control the possible effects between advice and demographic characteristics.  We 
use the following mode for robustness of our main multivariate  model:  
% Asset Allocationi =  + 1FinancialAdvicei + 2Agei + 3Femalei + 4FUMi +5Age*FinancialAdvicei +  
6Female*FinancialAdvicei + 7FUM*FinancialAdvicei + i     (4) 
The left hand side variable Asset Allocationi is the percentage of asset allocation for j asset 
class categories available in the KiwiSaver fund portfolio for investor i (where j = 4 and asset classes 
are Cash, Bonds, Property and Equity).   is the constant term, FinancialAdvicei is a dummy variable 
which equals to 1, if the KiwiSaver member has received financial advice, Agei is the age of the 
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investor in years, Femalei is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the investor is female and 0 if the 
investor is male; and FUMi is the value of funds under management in an investor’s KiwiSaver 
account. Agei*FinancialAdvicei, Femalei*FinancialAdvicei, and FUMi*FinancialAdvicei are interaction 
terms between Agei,  Femalei ,  FUMi  and FinancialAdvicei , and  i is the error term.  
Lastly, we compare the differences in performance for advised and non-advised accounts by 
calculating the average returns for investors who received advice and investors who did not. We 
then compute t-tests to see whether there are statistical differences in returns between the two 
groups. The returns used in this calculation are the actual KiwiSaver investment fund returns earned 
by investors in our sample which were downloaded from Morningstar Direct.  In order to check for 
robustness of our findings, we further generate hypothetical returns using the average asset 
allocation weights for accounts held and market return indices. The returns indices also come from 
Morningstar Direct from January 2000 to December 2012. 
 
4. Results 
Who seeks advice? 
Table 3 shows the probability of receiving financial advice based on investor characteristics 
of age, gender and funds under management. The interpretation of the coefficients in a probit 
model is not as straight forward as in a linear model. The increase in the probability attributed to a 
one-unit increase in a given independent variable is dependent both on the values of the other 
predictors and the starting value of the given predictors.  As shown in Table 3, there is a positive 
relationship between receiving financial advice and variables: age, female and funds under 
management. This means that older investors are more likely to receive advice.  Females are also 
more likely to receive advice than males, and the propensity to receive advice increases with the 
amount of funds under management in investment accounts. Our findings differ from the results of 
Bluethgen et al. (2007) and Hackethal, Haliassos and Japelli (2012) who find that financial advisers 
mostly serve younger investors with less wealth.  We graph the probability of receiving advice based 
on funds under management controlling for age and gender to look at the relationship of fund 
balance and advice in isolation. As shown in Figure 1 in the Appendix, a balance between $20,000-
$30,000 of money invested results in the largest change in probability of receiving advice, as 
indicated by the steepest part of the curve. 
[Insert Table 3 here ] 
11 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here ] 
Our findings raise a number of questions with broad possible implications. Why do women, 
older investors and investors with relatively more funds under management receive advice? And 
conversely why don’t men, younger investors and investors with smaller investment balances seek 
advice? Is it related to the level of financial literacy a person has? van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie 
(2011) find that households with higher financial literacy are more likely to rely on professional 
financial advisers and households with low financial literacy tend to rely on informal sources of 
information such as through friends and family.  van Rooji et al. (2011) state that financial literacy 
differs substantially depending on education, age and gender. Poorer, less educated and immigrant 
households often exhibit lower levels of financial literacy (Calvet, Campbell & Sodini, 2009). Women 
display much lower basic financial knowledge than men and advanced literacy is low among the 
young and high among middle-aged individuals (van Rooji, et al., 2011; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008). If 
financial mistakes are most prevalent among groups that have low financial literacy as Agarwal, 
Driscoll, Gabaix and Laibson (2009) suggest, it would seem that those who need financial advice the 
most are not receiving it.  Bhattacharya et al. (2012) find a similar case in Germany where those who 
receive advice tend to follow it, but those who do not receive advice need the advice the most.  
What difference does financial advice make on investment fund asset allocation? 
Table 4 presents the results from t-tests that show the difference in asset allocation 
between investor subgroups. We find that financial advice is most transformative in that people who 
receive advice hold their assets differently compared to people who do not.  Gender also spears to 
play a significant role in asset allocation.  
[Insert Table 4 here ] 
We compare women and men with and without advice in Panels A, B, C and D of Table 4. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that among those investors who received advice, men tend to hold a higher 
proportion of equity and property asset classes in their funds and less cash and bond assets than 
women. Of the investors who received advice, women hold on average 4.7% less equity than men 
and 7.6% more cash assets in their funds. Panel B shows the average fund holdings of investors who 
do not have financial advice. Men still hold more risky (property and equity) assets than women, 
however the difference is smaller. For example, men hold 2.2% more in equity and 6% less in cash 
than women. When we further split the subsamples to examine the difference between males and 
females with and without financial advice in Panel C and Panel D, we find that financial advice has a 
much larger effect on asset allocation. Those who received advice are far more likely to hold more 
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equity and property assets and less cash and bond asset classes. Panel C shows that men who 
received advice hold 16.2% more equity and a significant 45% less of cash in their investment funds 
compared with men who do not receive advice. Panel D shows similar results of that in Panel C for 
women. Women who receive advice hold 13.3% more equity and 43% less cash than women who 
have not received advice.  
In the bottom Panel of Table 4 we show the asset allocation of investors who have enrolled 
into their accounts actively and those who enrolled via default. Not surprisingly, actively enrolled 
investors hold more equity and property assets than default enrolled investors (who are typically 
invested in the Conservative fund). Actively enrolled investors hold 2.3 times more equity than 
default enrolled investors and 35.5% less cash assets than default enrolled investors.  
We show our univariate regression results in Panel A of Table 5. Financial advice is negatively 
related to cash and bond asset holdings and positively related to property and equity asset classes. 
Receiving financial advice reduces cash and bond holdings by 5% and 4%, respectively, while 
increases property and equity class investment by 2% and 6%. This result is in line with the financial 
advice audit results that Mullainathan, Noth and Schoar (2010) indicated in their study. They find 
that advice tends to promote a higher equity mix.  Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) and 
Bhattacharya, et al. (2012) discuss the conflict of interest between adviser remuneration structure 
and investment product recommendation.  
[Insert Table 5 here ] 
When we add demographic characteristics of age, gender and the level of funds under 
management in the multivariate regression, we find that the relationship between demographic 
characteristics and asset allocation are statistically significant in all the models except for the 
relationship between cash allocation and gender.  As shown in Panel B of Table 5, age is positively 
related to cash and bond asset allocation and negatively related to property and equity asset 
allocation. This means that as investors increase in age they tend to hold relatively safer assets than 
riskier assets.  This finding provides support to the life-cycle theory which states that the younger an 
investor the more flexible he is in his future savings rate and therefore can afford to take more risks 
(Bodie, Merton & Samuelson, 1992, Cocco, Gomes & Maenhourt, 2005). The opposite trend is 
shown for funds under management. We find that as the balance of investor’s account increases 
they will hold more equity and property assets and less cash and fixed interest assets. This finding is 
in line with academic literature which links wealth to financial sophistication. Using Swedish data, 
Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2007) find that households with greater financial sophistication, as 
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measured by wealth or education, tend to invest more efficiently but also more aggressively (riskier). 
These households tend to invest more in risky assets and choose more diversified portfolios, 
however, at times at the expense of bearing higher return losses than unsophisticated households 
that have not invested in risky assets. Furthermore, Hilgerth, Hogarth and Beverly (2003) 
demonstrate a strong link between financial knowledge and financial behaviour, showing that those 
who know more are likely to engage in recommended financial behaviours—such as paying all bills 
on time, reconciling the checkbook every month, and having an emergency fund.  
When we examine the results from our pooled findings in Panel C of Table 5, we find that 
the financial advice dummy coefficients are robust and do not change when we add demographic 
variables and interaction terms. We find that interaction term between age and financial advice is 
negative for cash holdings and positive for equity holdings. Because the coefficient for the 
interaction term between advice and age must be interpreted with the coefficient of age, we find 
that as a whole advised-accounts tend to invest more in equity and less in cash assets compared to 
non-advised accounts, however, the proportion of risky-assets held decreases relatively with age and 
the proportion of cash assets held increases with age, as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 in the 
Appendix. This suggests that advisers tailor their recommendations in relation to the life-cycle 
theory. That is, reducing the proportion of riskier assets (e.g. equities) as people get closer to 
retirement age (age 65).  
[Insert Figure 2 and 3 here from the Appendix] 
If advisers are already adopting the life-cycle theory in their recommendations as our 
findings suggest, then why aren’t default investment funds life-cycle based? Would this save time 
and costs and shift inert investors into funds suited to their age-based risk profile? An OECD study 
focussing on default investment strategies in defined contribution pension plans by Antolin, Payet 
and Yermo (2012, p20.) found that life-cycle fund strategies would have provided protection against 
market risk around the time of three major equity shocks in the US and similarly in Japan, 
demonstrating the potential value of life cycle strategies in protecting pension benefits against 
equity risk in the years prior to the retirement date. Basu and Drew (2006) investigate the 
appropriateness of various asset allocation strategies actually adopted by defined contribution plans 
as default options in Australia. They also find that asset allocation strategies with higher allocation to 
equities result in higher wealth outcomes for participants, controlling for periods of extreme equity 
market returns.  
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While there is support for life-cycle based funds as the default investment option for 
pension plans, the key issue of adopting a one-size-fits-all life-cycle strategy is that it may not be 
suitable for individuals who are less risk-tolerant. For instance, a highly risk averse investor, 
regardless of their age, may not want exposure to risky assets under any circumstance. In this 
instance, unless the investor is paying attention to the fund they have been placed by default, they 
may not know to switch to a less risky fund. A mitigating factor in this situation is that under the 
current KiwiSaver scheme in New Zealand, if people are uncomfortable with the default choices, 
they are free to switch to alternative options that better suit their risk profile needs. Changing the 
default fund option from the existing model to a life-cycle based strategy has the potential for 
inducing existing non-active investors to become more engaged and be aware of their investment 
fund choice. 
 
 
 
What are the differences in returns? 
We next turn to the question of how the accounts of investment funds track for investors 
who receive advice compared to investors who do not. Table 6 shows the annual fund returns 
between investor groups. 
[Insert Table 6 here ] 
Investors who received advice tend to earn higher returns in years where equity markets 
perform well. This is not surprising. As we find in early results, advised accounts tend to hold more 
equity assets than non-advised accounts. What makes the question of ‘do advised accounts 
outperform non-advise accounts?’ difficult to answer lies in that the return series for KiwiSaver 
investment funds is extremely short and saving for retirement typically occurs over long term 
periods, sometimes up to 45 years.  It is hard to say with absolute certainty that financial advice 
generates higher returns than non-advised accounts until the end of the investment period. In a 
retirement savings context, this means that only when investors retire, they can finally see their 
returns of the total investment horizon. For instance, a 20-year old joining the workforce today, 
enrolling in KiwiSaver, who seeks financial advice and then selects an investment fund, may not 
realise their return until 45 years later when they retire at the age of 65. At which point does this 
individual realise the benefit of paying for financial advice? Since the national retirement savings 
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scheme started only just in 2007 there is a limit to how much we can say in regards to how advised 
accounts track against non-advised accounts with a short returns series.  Hackethal et al. (2012) 
point to a puzzle that exists in terms of why investors continue to purchase funds under advice that 
appear to perform no better yet cost substantially more. They suggest that the answer to this puzzle 
lies in that researchers may fail to measure intangible benefits of the brokerage relationship. In 
general, however, we can see that financial advice is transformative. It promotes investing into 
equity asset categories than otherwise and depending on the risk tolerance of an investor, which 
may have been an option otherwise overlooked if the advice was not there. In accordance with the 
life-cycle theory, the earlier someone invests for their retirement, the more they are able to invest in 
instruments that provide long-term growth. Similarly, if one does not begin planning for retirement 
until later, they may choose to invest assets with greater short term stability. Numerous studies 
have focussed on the importance of asset allocation on portfolio returns. For example, past studies 
have shown that 90% of the variability of returns over time can be explained by asset allocation 
(Brinson, Hood & Beebower, 1986, 1991 & 1995) and 40% variation of returns across funds 
(Ibbotson & Kaplan, 2000).  
Since we are limited in our study by a short-returns series on KiwiSaver fund returns, we 
generate hypothetical returns using the average weights for advised and non-advised accounts and 
market indices returns from 2000-2012 to extend the time period and check for robustness. Figure 4 
in the Appendix shows the results. 
We find that the hypothetical portfolio returns derived from advised-client asset allocations 
do not differ strongly or statistically from non-advised clients over monthly, quarterly or annual 
periods from 2000 to 2012. The hypothetical returns calculated based on average asset allocation 
holdings of the two subgroups shown in Table 4  are unrelated to the investment fund returns that 
we actually received by the investors in our sample.  We are not surprised that differences in 
average asset allocation lead to insignificant differences in hypothetical returns between subgroups 
because the difference in fund choice and asset allocation is marginal when the average is used. We 
hope to use actual KiwiSaver fund returns which are longer in time frame in the future. In the short 
term, asset allocation may not have a large effect on returns but over a 40-year investment period 
the result may be much different.  
We now consider the additional functions that financial advice may serve, outside of 
providing performance alone. As suggested by Bergresser et al. (2009), the reason why many people 
prefer to use brokers - despite the inferior performance and higher distribution fees involved with 
broker-sold funds – is because of intangible benefits which are difficult to measure. According to van 
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Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011), there is a shift to greater responsibility for financial decisions on 
the individual investor and their ability to make sound investment decisions has never been more 
important because increasingly more complex financial products and markets are being created. 
Therefore, it seems plausible that investors seek advice to reduce their behaviour biases (as 
discussed in Barberis and Thaler, 2003), help identify investor risk tolerance, and generally ask 
questions that increase the level of comfort from financial decisions.  If this is the case then the role 
of financial advice ought to be more focused on intangible benefits. Perhaps emphasis on financial 
advice should predominately be placed on its educational role, instead of higher returns. This may 
be the type of cultural shift required in order to push New Zealand towards higher financial literacy 
and advice-seeking patterns similar to countries such as Germany, which has 80% of their population 
seeking advice. Yaniv (2004) argues that receiving advice (of any type) improves the accuracy of 
decision-making because it serves a special function that enables people to overcome their self-
confirmation tendencies and biases.  Frijns, Gilbert and Tourani-Rad (2012) find that there is a 
positive and causal effect of financial experience on financial knowledge. This means that financial 
knowledge can be obtained not only through education, but also experience. Therefore, regardless 
of the financial gains from receiving advice, the experience of receiving advice in itself through 
discussing with an adviser and making investment fund choices adds to improving financial literacy 
and knowledge of individuals and households.  
 
Conclusion 
We explore differences in portfolio composition between investors who receive financial 
advice and those who do not. We find that financial advice is transformative and changes the way 
investors allocate their assets in investments. We arrive at several interesting findings: (1) older, 
wealthier and female investors are among the population that is more likely to receive financial 
advice; (2) financial advice is negatively related to cash and bond asset holdings and positively 
related to property and equity asset classes. Receiving financial advice reduces cash and bond 
holdings by 5% and 4%, respectively, while increases property and equity class investment by 2% and 
6%; (3) age, gender and wealth are also related to asset allocation. Men tend to take more risks than 
women. In addition, as investors increase in age, they tend to hold relatively safer assets than riskier 
assets. Furthermore, as the balances of accounts increase investors will hold more equity and 
property assets and less cash and fixed interest assets; (4) advisers tend to tailor their 
recommendations based on the life-cycle theory when providing advice and; (5) investors who 
received advice tend to earn higher returns in years when equity markets perform well.  
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This paper makes two key contributions to the existing literature. First, we exploit the use of 
a new proprietary dataset to understand the relationship between financial advice and individual 
investor decisions in a different setting. Previous studies have not investigated the relation between 
financial advice in an auto-enrolment retirement investment setting before. To our best knowledge, 
this is the largest sample of individual investor accounts nationwide that also includes information 
on financial advice which allows us to address the role of financial advice and asset allocation with 
more precision. Second, we distinctly measure who has received independent financial advice in our 
population across a nationwide sample, where previous studies focussed on brokerage information 
within one investment company.  
Our findings raise a number of questions. We show that 10% of the population involved in 
KiwiSaver receive financial advice. Why do New Zealanders shy away from getting financial advice? 
Does financial advice need to be more targeted to specific groups who need it the most? How could 
advice be provided to households that have lower levels of financial literacy in order to improve 
their investment knowledge?  Furthermore, if financial advisers recommend clients to select 
investment products in line with Bodie, Merton and Samuelson’s (1992) life-cycle theory, then 
should life-cycle related investment products be more abundant? Or perhaps be considered more 
seriously as a default option? We look forward to more research in this area to be developed.  
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Table 1. Investor Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table shows a summary of the number of investors enrolled in each of the four KiwiSaver 
Providers we have in our sample. Provider 1 and Provider 2 are large commercial banks and Provider 
3 includes investors who have come through the financial advisor track. Provider 4 is a default 
provider which means that members enrolled have not actively engaged in the selection process of 
which investment fund to invest in and have entered the KiwiSaver scheme by default. The members 
are split into gender and age group categories. Total Funds Under Management (FUM) shows the 
minimum, maximum and average funds under management for investors in our sample.   
 
  
Provider 
1 
Provider 
2 
Provider 
3 
Provider 
4* Total 
      
Number of investors 115,059 152,133 63,823 74,092 405,107 
 28% 38% 16% 18%  
Males 53,330 71,688 32,168 36,497 193,683 
 28% 37% 17% 19%  
Females 61,729 80,445 31,655 37,595 211,424 
 29% 38% 15% 18%  
AgeU16 30,626 35,525 3,570 377 70,098 
 44% 51% 5% 1%  
Age16-25 25,326 33,956 9,366 17,112 85,760 
 30% 40% 11% 20%  
Age26-40 19,042 32,758 16,839 26,063 94,702 
 20% 35% 18% 28%  
Age41-59 26,898 35,050 23,297 24,899 110,144 
 24% 32% 21% 23%  
Age60-65 9,903 11,185 7,829 4,501 33,418 
 30% 33% 23% 13%  
Age65+ 3,264 3,659 2,922 1,140 10,985 
  30% 33% 27% 10%   
      
Total Funds Under 
Management (FUM) 
     
Min FUM 100 100 100 100  -  
Max FUM 166,628 154,863 221,612 181,010  -  
Mean FUM 3,444 4,041 8,799 5,146  -  
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Table 2. Investment Fund Asset Allocation 
  
Single Sector Funds Cash 
Fixed 
Interest 
Property  Shares Alternatives 
Cash 100     
Fixed Income (New 
Zealand) 
 100    
Fixed Income 
(International) 
 100    
Property (Australasian)   100   
Property (International)   100   
Equity (Australasian)    100  
Equity (International)    100  
Sustainable Growth Fund    60 40 
Multi-Sector Funds           
Conservative 20 60 3 17  
Conservative-Balanced 15 50 6 29  
Balanced 10 40 8 42  
Balanced-Growth 6 29 10 55  
Growth 4 16 12 68   
 
This table shows the asset allocation of the investment funds offered by the four KiwiSaver 
Providers. Provider 1, 2 and 4 offer one single sector fund (Cash fund) and five multi-sector funds. 
Provider 3 offers all the single sector funds and multi-sector funds listed above.   
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Table 3. Who receives advice? 
  β Pr > ChiSq 
α -2.143 <.0001*** 
Age 0.011 <.0001*** 
Female 0.078 <.0001*** 
Funds Under Management 0.00007 <.0001*** 
 
This table reports the results from the probit regression with the financial advice dummy as the 
dependent variable.  Financial Advicei =  + 1Agei + 2Femalei + 3FUMi + i  
Where the left hand side variable Financial Advicei  is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if an 
investor received financial advice and 0 otherwise.  is the constant term, Agei is the age of the 
investor in years, Femalei is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the KiwiSaver member is female 
and 0 if the investor is male, FUMi is the value of funds under management in investor’s KiwiSaver 
account, and i is the error term. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4. Asset Allocation T-tests 
Asset Allocation T-Tests 
Panel A: Financial Advice  
  N Cash    Bonds   Property   Equity   
  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
Male 19405 0.104  0.305  0.101  0.489  
Female 21371 0.112  0.326  0.096  0.467  
T-Stat  -5.45 *** -12.1 *** 5.930 *** 11.37 *** 
          
Panel B: No Financial Advice 
    Cash    Bonds   Property   Equity   
  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
Male 174278 0.151  0.352  0.076  0.421  
Female 190053 0.160  0.354  0.074  0.412  
T-Stat  -13.32 *** -3.14 ** 10.39 *** 12.24 *** 
          
Panel C: Males 
    Cash    Bonds   Property   Equity   
  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
No Advice Male 174278 0.151  0.352  0.076  0.421  
Advice Male 19405 0.104  0.305  0.101  0.489  
T-Stat  39.72 *** 35.05 *** -34.8 *** -42.67 *** 
          
Panel D: Females 
    Cash    Bonds   Property   Equity   
  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
No Advice Female 190053 0.160  0.354  0.074  0.412  
Advice Female 21371 0.112  0.326  0.096  0.467  
T-Stat  41.08 *** 23.02 *** -34.03 *** -34.03 *** 
          
Panel E: Active Fund Enrolment 
    Cash    Bonds   Property   Equity   
  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
Default Enrolment 106252 0.187  0.563  0.038  0.213  
Active Enrolment 298855 0.138  0.273  0.091  0.497  
T-Stat   107.53 *** 619.41 *** -453.41 *** -499.66 *** 
 
This table reports the T-statistics and means for KiwiSaver members by financial advice, gender, and 
enrolment method.   
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Table 5. OLS Regressions 
Panel A: Univariate 
  Cash   Bonds   Property   Equity   
α 0.16 *** 0.35 *** 0.07 *** 0.42 *** 
 460.1  1042.7  1073.3  1054.2  
Financial Advice  -0.05 *** -0.04 *** 0.02 *** 0.06 *** 
  -57.1   -40.9   48.6   56.6   
Panel B:  Multivariate 
  Cash   Bonds   Property   Equity  
α 0.0656 *** 0.1984 *** 0.1098 *** 0.6263 *** 
 87.4  310.4  678.2  827.3  
Financial Advice  -0.0624 *** -0.0933 *** 0.0327 *** 0.1230 *** 
 -71.2  -101.4  69.4  117.4  
Age 0.0032 *** 0.0048 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0068 *** 
 136.1  276.4  -276.8  -408.4  
Female 0.0004  -0.005 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0041 *** 
 0.59  -9.24  5.70  6.40  
FUM -0.000003 *** -0.0000003 *** 0.000001 *** 0.000003 *** 
  -56.2   -6.68   31.1   47.9   
Panel C: Interaction Terms 
 Cash  Bonds  Property  Equity  
α 0.0651 *** 0.1944 *** 0.1106 *** 0.6299 *** 
 81.4  292.3  798.1  803.9  
Financial Advice  -0.0540 *** -0.0356 *** 0.0197 *** 0.0699 *** 
 -25.9  -14.2  13.4  22.7  
Age 0.0033 *** 0.0049 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0070 *** 
 128.5  256.9  -368.4  -396.9  
Female 0.0003  -0.0073 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0059 *** 
 0.40  -11.94  9.62  8.56  
FUM -0.000004 *** 0.0000006 *** 0.0000005 *** 0.0000 *** 
 -52.9  9.1  36.4  37.5  
FA*age -0.0006 *** -0.0011 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0014 *** 
 -9.8  -19.0  8.5  22.1  
FA*Female 0.000374  0.0199 *** -0.0035 *** -0.0168 *** 
 0.23  11.73  -3.68  -8.57  
FA*FUM 0.0000019 *** -0.0000025 *** 0.0000004 *** 0.0000002  
  16.7   -22.7   7.08   1.45   
 
This table reports the results from the OLS regression with % Asset Allocationi as the dependent 
variable.  The left hand side variable Asset Allocationi is the percentage of asset allocation for j asset 
class categories available in the KiwiSaver fund portfolio for investor i (where j = 4 and asset classes 
are Cash, Bonds, Property and Equity).   is the constant term, FinancialAdvicei is a dummy variable, 
which equals to 1 if the KiwiSaver member has received financial advice, Agei is the age of the 
investor in years, Femalei  is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the investor is female and 0 if the 
investor is male; FUMi is the value of funds under management in an investor’s KiwiSaver account. 
Agei*FinancialAdvicei, Femalei*FinancialAdvicei, and FUMi*FinancialAdvicei are interaction terms 
between Agei,  Femalei ,  FUMi  and FinancialAdvicei and I is the error term. *, **, and *** denotes 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively based. 
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Table 6. Returns Differences T-tests 
Annual Return  Advice No Advice T-stat 
Return2008 -12.90 -10.38 46.2 
Return2009 13.28 11.72 -60.9 
Return2010 6.93 6.65 -43.4 
Return2011 2.41 2.96 43.3 
Return2012 14.58 13.10 -60.1 
 
 
This table reports the T-statistics and means annual returns from 2008-2012 for investors who have 
received financial advice compared to investors without financial advice. The returns used are 
KiwiSaver investment fund returns from Morningstar, calculated net of fees.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the probability of receiving financial advice as a function of funds under 
management. 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the proportion of cash holdings relative to investor 
age for investors with and without advice. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the proportion of equity holdings relative to 
investor age for investors with and without advice. 
 
 
Figure 4. Differences in portfolio returns  
 
 N Female T-Value Male T-Value All T-Value 
Month 240 0.010 0.62 0.015 0.69 0.012 0.65 
Quarter 49 0.037 0.57 0.051 0.64 0.044 0.6 
Annual 12 0.244 0.68 0.324 0.72 0.281 0.7 
 
This table shows the T-values for differences in portfolio returns between female investors who 
attain advice with female investors without advice, male investors with advice compared with male 
investors without advice and investors who receive advice compared with investors without advice. 
The returns used were calculated based on hypothetical asset allocation fund holdings and market 
return indices.  
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